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I. INTRODUCTION
EVERAL interesting corporation law cases were decided by Texas
courts during the Survey period,' and these cases have been divided
into the general categories of corporate disregard and corporate fi-
duciary duties. Most of the corporate disregard cases discussed in Section
II involve an application of the alter ego analysis set forth in Castleberry
v. Branscum,2 as subsequently modified by the Texas Legislature. 3 These
cases indicate that Texas courts are appropriately reluctant to disregard
the corporate form except when faced with compelling circumstances.
The fiduciary duty cases covered in Section III involve breaches of the
duty of loyalty and illustrate the bad judgment of a few self-interested
officers and directors.
Although the Texas Legislature was not in session during the Survey
period and there were no legislative developments to report, a bill that
will make many significant amendments to the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act (TBCA) is expected to pass early in the 1997 legislative session.
A summary of the significant provisions of the bill is available in last
year's Survey article.4
II. CORPORATE DISREGARD
In Sims v. Western Waste Industries,5 the Beaumont Court of Appeals
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1. October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996.
2. 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986).
3. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1997).
4. See Alan W. Tompkins & Theodore S. O'Neal, Corporations, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 49 SMU L. REv. 821, 835 (1996).
5. 918 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied).
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addressed the issue of whether a parent corporation could voluntarily dis-
regard the corporate existence of its subsidiary in order to obtain statu-
tory workers' compensation immunity from the claims of a subsidiary
corporation's employee. Sims was injured while working as a trash col-
lector for Western Waste Industries of Texas, Inc. (WWIT). Sims sued
WWIT's parent, Western Waste Industries, Inc. (WWI), because of
WWI's role in the design and manufacture of the garbage truck involved
in Sims' injury. In its defense, WWI asserted that WWIT was merely its
alter ego and that the immunity granted to WWIT by the Texas workers'
compensation statute should be extended to WWI.
In rejecting WWI's reverse veil-piercing theory, the court reasoned
that because the separate and distinct nature of parent and subsidiary
corporations is generally respected under Texas law, 6 this division should
similarly be respected when a parent corporation is sued by an employee
of a subsidiary corporation. 7 The court, citing Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc.,8 found that Texas law does not permit a parent corporation
to obtain statutory immunity as a result of the voluntary disregard of the
subsidiary's corporate veil.9
In reaching its conclusion, the Sims court reviewed the status of the
corporate disregard doctrine in Texas. Quoting Castleberry,10 the court
stated that the corporate form will be disregarded when it has been used
as an "unfair device to achieve an inequitable result."'1 The doctrine was
modified by the Texas Legislature such that the failure to observe corpo-
rate formalities and constructive fraud is not generally considered in
proving alter ego status with respect to claims grounded in contract law.' 2
The focus of the doctrine is to prevent the use of the corporate formality
"as a cloak for fraud or illegality or to work an injustice .... "-13 The court
noted that "when the corporate form is used as an essentially unfair de-
vice-when it is used as a sham-courts may act in equity and disregard
the usual rules .... ,,14 The court pointed out that veil-piercing is an
equitable relief, therefore, courts will require those seeking relief to have
clean hands.' 5 For example, Texas courts have refused a director's alter
ego claim because he personally participated in disregarding the corpora-
tion's formalities, 16 and the courts have found it inequitable to allow one
who has chosen the corporate form to "pick and choose" when to be
6. Id. at 684.
7. Id.
8. 513 F. Supp. 314, 325-26 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (applying Texas law).
9. Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 684.
10. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271.
11. Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 684.
12. Id.; see TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21A(2), (3).
13. Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 684.
14. Id. (quoting Matthews Constr. Co. v. Rosen, 796 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. 1990)).
15. Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 685.
16. Id. (citing Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Dooley, 884 S.W.2d 805, 810
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied)).
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treated as a corporation.17 Therefore, the Sims court was not inclined to
grant WWI the relief it sought.'8
In Kasprzak v. American General Life & Accident Insurance Co.,19 the
plaintiff policyholders attempted to pierce the corporate veil of a subsidi-
ary life insurance company and to establish an alter ego relationship with
the subsidiary's parent corporation. The plaintiffs' objective was to de-
feat a removal to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.
American General Corporation (AmGen) owns AGC Life Insurance
Company, which owns American General Life & Accident Insurance
Company (AGL&A). The plaintiffs sued AmGen and AGL&A, claiming
misrepresentation in the sale of certain life insurance policies. The de-
fendant corporations removed the case to federal court, and the plaintiffs
moved to remand the case to state court. Although the plaintiffs sued
both AmGen and AGL&A, AmGen contended that AGL&A alone sold
and marketed the policies in question and that the plaintiffs had fraudu-
lently joined AmGen in order to destroy diversity jurisdiction. The plain-
tiffs sought to prove that AGL&A was the alter ego of AmGen, and
therefore, was properly joined in the case. 20
In its analysis, the court cited Castleberry2 1 for the proposition that the
corporate fiction generally will not be disregarded unless the subsidiary is
used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud, to avoid the effect of a statute, or in
other exceptional circumstances when the corporate form is being used to
achieve an inequitable result.22 The court stated, however, that there
must be something more than mere unity of financial interest, ownership,
and control before a court will treat a subsidiary as the alter ego of the
parent and make the parent liable for the subsidiary's actions.23 A show-
ing that there is a confluence of activities between the parent and subsidi-
ary, such as having some or all of the same officers or directors, filing
consolidated income tax returns, sharing a corporate logo, or conducting
intercorporate business, is not sufficient to make the parent liable for the
subsidiary.24
In making their case, the plaintiffs presented evidence that executives
were transferred between AmGen and AGL&A and that AmGen had
mentioned its reliance on the profitability of its subsidiaries. In response,
AmGen presented proof of the separate existence and operation of
AmGen. 25 Based upon AmGen's evidence, the court declined to disre-
gard AGL&A's separate existence and affirmed the removal of the
17. Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 685; see, e.g., Adams v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 549 S.W.2d 411,
413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Eastwood Model Market v. State,
359 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962), affd, 365 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1963).
18. Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 686.
19. 914 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
20. Id. at 145.
21. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272.
22. Kasprzak, 914 F. Supp. at 146.






Amoco Chemical Co. v. Tex Tin Corp.27 involved a CERCLA 28 action
in which the federal district court in Galveston also addressed issues in-
volving the fiduciary shield doctrine. The doctrine provides that the acts
of a corporation will be attributed to individuals for jurisdictional pur-
poses only if the corporate form can be disregarded in order to impose
personal liability on the individuals.2 9 The court noted that it looks to the
law of the state of incorporation of each corporate defendant in deter-
mining whether the corporate form should be disregarded. 30 Under the
laws of New York, Texas, and Delaware, which were applicable in this
case, the liabilities of the corporation will not reach its directors, officers,
or shareholders unless the corporate privilege has been abused or the
corporation has been dominated for personal use.31
Here, the plaintiff sued both the defendant corporations and their indi-
vidual shareholders. The court found that the defendants had submitted
evidence that none of the circumstances generally permitting the court to
pierce the corporate veil existed and that the plaintiffs had failed to sub-
mit evidence that any non-corporate defendants personally benefitted
from an abuse of the corporate privilege. 32 The only evidence produced
by the plaintiffs suggested that the corporate defendants had common
directors and officers. The court pointed out that this evidence might
support an argument that the veils of the corporate defendants could be
pierced to reach each corporation, but not to reach the individuals in
question.33 Consequently, the court held that the actions of the corporate
defendants did not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over the
individuals.34
The alter ego relationship between corporations was also at issue in
Old Republic Insurance Co. v. EX-IM Services Corp.35 In this case, the
Houston Court of Appeals employed the "single business enterprise"
doctrine to impose joint and several liability on several corporations in-
26. Id. The court later dismissed the plaintiffs' case altogether. See Kasprzak v.
American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
27. 925 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
28. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1995).
29. Id. at 1201 (citing Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding
that an individual's transaction of business within the state solely as a corporate officer
does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual)).
30. Amoco, 925 F. Supp. at 1201.
31. Id. at 1202; see, e.g., Thrift v. Hubbard, 44 F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that Texas law allows the corporate form to be pierced only against individuals who per-
sonally benefit from abusing the corporate privilege); Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271-73
(shareholders, officers, and directors are normally insulated from corporate liabilities un-
less they have abused the corporate privilege).
32. Amoco, 925 F. Supp. at 1202.
33. Id.; but see Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983) (stat-
ing that 100% stock ownership and commonality of officers and directors alone is not suffi-
cient to establish an alter ego relationship between two corporations).
34. Amoco, 925 F. Supp. at 1202.
35, 920 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
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tertwined in a customs house brokerage and freight forwarding busi-
ness.36 Old Republic Insurance sold customs bonds to Refugio Gonzales
and the corporations owned by him and his family, including Jetero Inter-
national, EX-IM Services Corp., and EX-IM Group. Gonzales, as a sole
proprietor, and the corporations conducted various import-export busi-
nesses. Old Republic sued Gonzales and the corporations to recover
amounts paid under the customs bond after Jetero International failed to
pay certain duties assessed by the United States Customs Service. Old
Republic alleged that the separate existence of the businesses should be
disregarded because a single enterprise existed between Gonzales and the
corporations, and the jury agreed.37 The trial court, however, entered
judgment n.o.v. in favor of Gonzales and the corporations, and Old Re-
public appealed. 38
In reviewing the j.n.o.v., the court of appeals cited Castleberry39 for the
proposition that the corporate form will be disregarded when a corpora-
tion is "operated as a mere tool or business conduit of another corpora-
tion, or when the corporate fiction is resorted to as a means of evading an
existing legal obligation. ' '40 According to the court, the single business
enterprise doctrine provides that when "corporations are not operated as
separate entities, but rather integrate their resources to achieve a com-
mon business purpose, each constituent corporation may be held liable
for the debts incurred in pursuit of that business purpose. ' 41 The evi-
dence indicated that the entities conducted similar businesses under simi-
lar names at the same addresses.42 Gonzales founded most of the
companies, served as the president of the EX-IM entities, and ran most of
the operations of each company. Employees testified that they per-
formed identical functions for each company. Old Republic presented
proof that bills for one of the companies were paid by another. Based on
this evidence, the court reversed the j.n.o.v. and rendered judgment in
favor of Old Republic. 43
In Gundle Lining Construction Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc.,44
the Fifth Circuit examined whether the alter ego doctrine supported per-
sonal jurisdiction over certain non-resident defendants in a suit involving
a payment bond for a large waste disposal project. Adams County
Asphalt, Inc. (ACA) agreed to work on the project for the City of Harris-
burg, Pennsylvania. ACA was owned by Robert Mumma II (Mumma),
who also owned Kimbob, Inc. (Kimbob). ACA obtained a bond from
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USF&G) to secure pay-
ment for its subcontractors. Mumma and Kimbob both agreed to indem-
36. Id. at 395-97.
37. Id. at 395.
38. Id.
39. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271-72.
40. Old Republic, 920 S.W.2d at 395.
41. Id. at 395-96.
42. Id. at 396.
43. Id. at 396-97.
44. 85 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 1996).
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nify USF&G for any amounts paid under the bond. ACA entered into an
agreement with Houston-based Gundle Lining Construction Company
(Gundle) for part of the work to be done on the project. When a dispute
over payment arose, Gundle sued USF&G to recover payment under the
bond. USF&G filed third-party complaints against ACA, Kimbob, and
Mumma, seeking indemnification, and settled with Gundle. ACA,
Kimbob, and Mumma, all non-residents of Texas, filed motions to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motions
and granted summary judgment in favor of USF&G; the defendants
appealed.
In its de novo review of the personal jurisdiction issue, the Fifth Circuit
found that because of the agreement between ACA and Gundle, Texas
courts could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over ACA.45 Regard-
ing Mumma and Kimbob, the court stated that "under Texas law, a find-
ing by the district court that Mumma and [Kimbob] were alter egos of
[Adams] would have permitted the lower court to disregard the corporate
fiction and pierce the corporate veil, thereby attributing [Adams'] con-
tacts to its co-defendants. '46 The only evidence offered to support
USF&G's alter ego assertion was financial evidence relating to Kimbob
and ACA.47 The court applied the factors established in United States v.
Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.48 to determine whether Kimbob was an alter ego of
ACA.4 9 The Jon-T factors are whether:
(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common stock ownership; (2)
the parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers; (3)
the parent and the subsidiary have common business departments;
(4) the parent and subsidiary file consolidated financial statements
and tax returns; (5) the parent finances the subsidiary; (6) the parent
caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary oper-
ates with grossly inadequate capital; (8) the parent pays the salaries
and other expenses of the subsidiary; (9) the subsidiary receives no
business except that given to it by the parent; (10) the parent uses
the subsidiaries property as its own; [and] (11) the daily operations
of the two corporations are not kept separate.50
The court reviewed the evidence, found it insufficient to support
USF&G's alter ego claim, and held that the alter ego claim against
Kimbob failed.51
45. Id. at 207.
46. Id. at 208.
47. Id.
48. 768 F.2d 686, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
49. The court noted that although the Jon-T factors were developed to determine
whether a subsidiary is the alter ego of its parent, the factors are also applicable to situa-
tions involving a claim that an individual is an alter ego of a corporation. Gundle, 85 F.3d
at 208 n.3. The court further noted that because the Texas Legislature amended the TBCA
to remove the failure to observe corporate formalities from the list of factors to be used in
proving alter ego claims, that factor would not be used in the court's analysis. Id. at 209
n.4.
50. Id. at 208-09.
51. Id. at 209.
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As to the alter ego claim against Mumma, the court noted that in addi-
tion to the previously mentioned factors, an alter ego determination must
also be based on a consideration of "[1] the total dealings of the corpora-
tion and the individual, [2] the amount of financial interest the individual
has in the corporation, [3] the ownership and control that the individual
maintains over the corporation, and [4] whether the corporation has been
used for personal purposes. z52 The only evidence in support of the alter
ego claim against Mumma was his signature on the indemnity agreement
and his signature on checks from ACA to Gundle. According to the
court, this evidence was insufficient to support the alter ego claim against
Mumma.53 Because USF&G failed to produce evidence that Mumma
and Kimbob were the alter egos of ACA, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
actions against Mumma and Kimbob based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction.54
Gonzales County Water Supply Corp. v. Jarzombek 5 involved a well-
drilling contract between Edward Jarzombek, Inc., d/b/a J-B Drilling
Company (JBD), and Gonzales County Water Supply Corporation (Gon-
zales). Gonzales sued JBD and its sole shareholder, Ed Jarzombek, alleg-
ing breach of contract and a Deceptive Trade Practices Act violation.
Gonzales claimed that Jarzombek had presented inconsistent statements
about the organization of his business that led to confusion about
whether Jarzombek was operating through a corporation or as a sole pro-
prietorship. Jarzombek moved for summary judgment, alleging that the
action against him in his individual capacity was improper and that the
contract was solely between the two corporations. Eventually, the district
court granted the summary judgment motion.56
In addressing Gonzales' claim that JBD was the alter ego of
Jarzombek, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals stated the general rule
that the corporate form normally insulates shareholders, officers, and di-
rectors from personal liability for corporate obligations and that only
when these individuals abuse the corporate privilege will the court disre-
gard the corporate fiction and hold them individually liable. 57 The court
then expressed its willingness to pierce the corporate veil, even if corpo-
rate formalities have been observed, when the corporate form has been
used unfairly to achieve an inequitable result.58
The court reviewed the factors to be considered when determining
whether to disregard the corporate veil, noting that the veil will be
disregarded:
52. Id. (citing Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 934 F.2d 635, 642 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
53. Gundle, 85 F.3d at 209.
54. Id. at 209, 211.
55. 918 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
56. Id. at 59.
57. Id. at 61 (citing Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271).
58. Id. (citing Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272).
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(1) when the fiction is used as a means of perpetrating fraud; (2)
where a corporation is organized and operated as a mere tool or
business conduit of another corporation; (3) where the corporate
form is resorted to as a means of evading an existing legal obligation;
(4) where the corporate fiction is employed to achieve or perpetuate
monopoly; (5) where the corporate fiction is used to circumvent a
statute; and (6) where the corporate fiction is relied upon as a pro-
tection of crime or to justify a wrong.59
The court noted that just because an individual owns all or a majority of
the stock of a corporation, the corporation is not necessarily the alter ego
of the shareholder.6° After reviewing the evidence, the court held that
the inconsistencies in Jarzombek's representations did not rise to the level
of "deception and guile" so as to warrant a finding that JBD was his alter
ego.61 Thus, the court affirmed the summary judgment in Jarzombek's
favor.62
Salazar v. Coastal Corp.6 3 involved a suit by Carlos Salazar against
Coastal Corporation (Coastal) and its subsidiaries, Coastal States Trad-
ing, Inc. (CSTI) and Coastal Petroleum N.V. (CPNV). Salazar had acted
as CSTI's Ecuadoran agent since 1986 with respect to the company's busi-
ness with PetroEcuador, the government-controlled oil company. Under
his agreement with CSTI, Salazar was entitled to a commission on each
barrel of oil sold to or purchased from PetroEcuador. Salazar sued when
CSTI terminated the relationship on the basis that CSTI was winding up
its operations in Ecuador. Just one day before CSTI terminated Salazar's
agency relationship, Coastal had received permission to substitute CPNV
in place of CSTI for Coastal's dealings with PetroEcuador. CPNV began
doing business with PetroEcuador after Salazar's agreement was termi-
nated. Salazar alleged that his agreement had been orally modified to
allow him to represent any of the Coastal entities doing business in Ecua-
dor, that the termination was a charade to avoid payment of compensa-
tion, and that each of the Coastal entities were alter egos of one
another.64 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Coastal,
and Salazar appealed.
In reviewing the alter ego claim, the Houston Court of Appeals, citing
Castleberry,65 noted that the alter ego doctrine is available when one cor-
poration is operated as a business conduit for another.66 Alter ego status
is established by evidence demonstrating a blurring of the lines of distinc-
tion between corporations, 67 and key factors to be considered include (1)





63. 928 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
64. Id. at 165.
65. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272.
66. Salazar, 928 S.W.2d at 169.
67. Id. at 170.
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establish demarcation between different entities in ordinary business mat-
ters.68 At trial, Salazar introduced evidence that when PetroEcuador re-
quired financial information from CSTI, Coastal's financial information
was provided. Letters concerning the different Coastal entities' dealings
with PetroEcuador were produced, demonstrating that the same employ-
ees wrote on behalf of Coastal, CSTI, and CPNV. Further, one man testi-
fied that he concurrently served as an officer of several Coastal entities
but was paid by only one of them. 69 Based on this proof, the court found
some evidence that Coastal had failed to maintain a distinction between
its entities and held that the summary judgment in favor of Coastal was
improperly granted.70
III. CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The summary judgment appeal in GNG Gas Systems, Inc. v. Dean71
gave the Amarillo Court of Appeals an opportunity to address the novel
issue of whether an agreement arising from a breach of fiduciary duty by
the parties to the agreement was legal.72 Aptly-named E.F. Gouge, one
of the initial shareholders and directors of Natural Gas Gathering Com-
pany of Texas, Inc. (NGGC), became the chief executive officer of the
company in 1988. Harry Dean and O.J. King were part of the manage-
ment team responsible for NGGC's operations. NGGC had contracts
with Graham Royalty, Ltd., Graham Energy, Ltd., and Graham Re-
sources, Inc. (collectively, Graham) regarding the operation of gas pipe-
lines in Utah and Garza County, Texas. Gouge negotiated the contracts
on behalf of NGGC, and Dean and King were in charge of various opera-
tions covered by the contracts.
Apparently dissatisfied with life at NGGC, Gouge made plans to form
his own company. As part of his entrepreneurial planning process,
Gouge negotiated an unwritten understanding with Graham that when
Gouge went out on his own, Graham would terminate the NGGC con-
tracts and sign permanent contracts with Gouge's new enterprise.73 In
order to divert attention from his departure and the corresponding loss of
the Graham contracts, Gouge agreed with Dean and King that shortly
after he resigned, Dean and King would also resign and form their own
company. When Gouge's company got the Graham contracts, the two
companies would split the profits.
The plan was effected in early 1990 when Gouge, Dean, and King re-




71. 921 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
72. Id. at 425. The court noted that the defendants had not cited, nor had the court's
research revealed, any "decision adjudicating the question of the legality, as between the
parties, of an agreement founded upon the parties' violation of their fiduciary duty to their
principal." Id at 427.
73. Id at 423.
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and King formed Northstar Gas Co., Inc. Graham's legal staff decided to
name only Northstar as a party to the contracts, rather than to name
Northstar and GNG jointly, so that Gouge's involvement would be less
apparent to NGGC. Unfortunately for Gouge, the omission caused Dean
and King to conclude that the profits from the Graham contracts be-
longed exclusively to Northstar and that neither Gouge nor GNG was
entitled to a share. According to Gouge's deposition testimony, Dean
and King "were able to starve me out since they controlled all the money
and[,] because of threats of lawsuits made to Graham by NGGC, they
have taken the business opportunities of NGGC for themselves and ex-
cluded me."'74
Gouge and GNG filed suit against Northstar, Dean, and King alleging
breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment.75 In a tour de
force of alternative pleading, the defendants denied the allegations and
claimed that the agreement with Gouge did not exist, was rescinded or
abandoned, was too vague or indefinite to be enforced, or was illegal and
unenforceable as a matter of law.76 The trial court granted summary
judgment and ordered that Gouge and GNG take nothing. 77
On appeal, Dean, King, and Northstar argued that because the transac-
tion by which Gouge diverted the business opportunities of NGGC to
himself was a breach of fiduciary duty and presumptively void, the agree-
ment for the sharing of revenues between the parties was, in turn, illegal
and unenforceable. 78 The appellate court pointed out that although
Gouge openly admitted his breach of fiduciary duty, he did not say that
the agreement with Dean and King was illegal. 79 The court further noted
that NGGC, the party with standing to challenge the agreement, did not
seek to have the agreement declared illegal but instead sought damages
stemming from the breaches of fiduciary duty.80 In fact, the agreement
between Gouge, Dean, and King was "to engage in a lawful enterprise,
i.e. the operation of a gas pipeline transportation system and the market-
ing of gas .... -81 The court held that "[t]he fact that the agreement arose
from the parties' violation of their fiduciary duty to their principal is not
alone sufficient to show the agreement is illegal as to them. ' 82 Therefore,
Dean, King, and Northstar were not entitled to summary judgment on
that point. 83 The court overruled the other points raised by Dean, King,
and Northstar and reversed and remanded the case. 84
Two other cases decided during the Survey period involving breaches
74. Id. at 424.
75. Id. at 425.
76. Id. at 426.
77. Id.




82. Id. at 428.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 429.
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of the duty of loyalty were General Dynamics v. Torres85 and In re Gen-
eral Homes Corp.86 At the center of General Dynamics was an equip-
ment lease between El Paso Sand, Inc., a lower-tier subsidiary of General
Dynamics, and LTM. LTM was a partnership consisting of Richard Levy,
president of El Paso Sand, Louis Torres, a manager and purported officer
of the corporation, and Donald McCoy, a vice president of El Paso Sand.
In 1984, LTM purchased a piece of construction equipment that was use-
ful to El Paso Sand's operations and that LTM expected to quickly sell at
a profit. The purchase was financed by Texas Commerce Bank (TCB).
When the sale fell through, LTM leased the equipment to El Paso Sand.
About a year later, LTM sold the equipment to Desert West, Inc., as-
signed the lease, and realized a profit of $100,000. Desert West failed
about eighteen months later, so LTM repurchased the equipment and ex-
ecuted a new lease with El Paso Sand. Torres signed the lease for LTM
and McCoy signed it for El Paso Sand. LTM's purchase of the equipment
from Desert West was also financed by TCB. The lease payment was set
equal to the principal and interest payment on the TCB note and was to
be paid directly to TCB.
Donald McCoy died in 1988, and shortly thereafter Levy and Torres
were terminated from their employment with El Paso Sand. The corpo-
ration stopped making the lease payments on the equipment, and TCB
made demand on the indebtedness. TCB, Torres, Levy, and McCoy's es-
tate settled the matters involving the indebtedness. In March of 1990,
Torres filed suit on behalf of LTM against El Paso Sand seeking damages
for the breach of the lease.87 The trial court entered judgment in favor of
LTM. 88
In reviewing the matter, the El Paso Court of Appeals noted that when
an officer with an interest in a transaction seeks to enforce the transaction
against the corporation, the court will scrutinize the transaction closely to
see that the officer has met his burden of proving the utmost fairness and
good faith of the transaction.89 The court found no evidence to support a
finding of fairness or good faith in the lease transaction,90 and thus held
that Torres had failed to meet his burden of proof.91 Although Torres
contended that El Paso Sand had ratified the transaction, the court noted
that ratification is only effective if all material facts are disclosed to the
directors or shareholders of the corporation.92 The court found no evi-
dence to support Torres' assertion of ratification, 93 held that the transac-
tion was "done for [the] express purpose of the LTM partners'
85. 915 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied).
86. 199 B.R. 148 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
87. Torres, 915 S.W.2d at 48.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 49.
90. Id.





enrichment," 94 and reversed and rendered judgment in favor of El Paso
Sand. 95
In re General Homes Corp.96 involved the approval of new employ-
ment agreements, with significantly increased salaries and severance ben-
efits, for three officers of the bankrupt corporation. The controversy
arose because two of the officers also comprised two-thirds of the corpo-
ration's three-member board of directors, which approved the agree-
ments without a meeting and after a portion of the services had been
provided, and because the agreements did not provide the corporation
with any significant additional benefit. The agreements were approved
by the bankruptcy court over the creditors' objections, but the creditors
appealed the decision to the district court.
In reviewing the issue, the court noted that employment contracts that
substantially increase officers' salaries and severance benefits fall outside
a corporation's ordinary course of business. 97 The court reasoned that
the business judgment rule did not apply to protect the board's decision
in this instance because of the conservatorship context and because "the
actions involve self-dealing or agreements outside the ordinary course of
business. '98 The court found that the board had "ignored the best inter-
est of the corporation and the need for uncorrupted business judgment
during the reorganization" 99 and ordered that the excess payments made
to the officers be returned to the bankruptcy estate. 100
94. Id.
95. Id. at 51.
96. 199 B.R. 148.
97. Id. at 150.
98. Id. at 151.
99. Id. at 152.
100. Id. at 153.
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